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Abstract
We analyze the dynamic interaction between imitation and myopic optimiza-
tion in an environment of changing marginal payoﬀs. Focusing on ﬁnite irreducible
environments, we unfold a trade-oﬀ between the degree of interaction and the size
of environmental shocks. The optimizer outperforms the imitator if interaction
is weak or if shocks are large. We use the example of Cournot duopoly to give
economic meaning to this condition. To establish our main result, we rely on con-
tinuous state space Markov theory. In particular, it turns out that introducing
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During the last decade there has emerged an exhaustive literature on the evolution
of behavior in games. Only some contributions to this literature have examined the
interaction of diﬀerent behavioral rules. All but a few presume a stable environment in
which interaction takes place. Typically, the interaction of diﬀerent behavioral rules is
focused on the interaction of imitative behavior and myopic optimization. Prominent
examples include Conlisk (1980), Kaarbøe and Tieman (2001), Schipper (2001), and
Droste et al (2002). In all these papers imitators and optimizers interact in a stable
environment where cost and demand conditions continue to be the same every period.
As one of the main insights in this literature we have learned that the less sophisti-
cated imitators outperform the more sophisticated (though myopic) optimizers. Imita-
tors of successful behavior experience an evolutionary advantage in that they generally
earn at least as high payoﬀ as other types of behavior. Sometimes, and in particular in
submodular (or Cournot type) games, this can lead to strictly higher payoﬀ.I nt h i sc a s e
the imitation rule works like a commitment device, inducing the imitator to bring higher
quantities to the market and leading to higher relative payoﬀ. The obvious question
arises when and under what circumstances a higher degree of sophistication would pay.
The purpose of our paper is to shed light on the role of stability in the environ-
ment. Therefore, we analyze the dynamic interaction between an imitator and a myopic
optimizer within the changing environment of a Cournot type game. Our focus is to
determine which type of behavioral rule, imitation or myopic optimization, earns higher
payoﬀ in a changing environment. To this end, we consider a model where players inter-
act recurrently in a world of changing marginal payoﬀ, playing a symmetric quadratic
game of strategic substitutes.
In our view the assumption of a stable environment represents a strong assumption
for at least two reasons. First, cost and/or demand function normally change over
the business cycle. In that sense, the models referred to above, make an unrealistic
assumption. More importantly, however, stability implicitly builds in an advantage for
imitation. This is due to the fact that imitators always and only look into the past
when deciding which quantity to put into the market. In contrast, myopic optimizers
play a best response to past behavior, but take into account the current state of the
environment. When demand and/or cost function can change from period to period,
imitation is a more risky behavioral rule to follow than it is within a stable environment.
For instance, it might be that one imitates a ﬁrm producing a high quantity last period
and does not take into account that demand is lower in this period. Whenever this leads
to a market price below average cost, imitators will incur a higher loss than optimizers.
Similarly, if demand has increased, an optimizer will in general respond with a higher
quantity, whereas the imitator will stick to some relatively low quantity. In this case,
both will presumably earn positive payoﬀ, but the optimizer a higher one. To emphasize
this diﬀerence between imitation and myopic optimization, we will exclusively focus on
permanently changing environments.
However, it turns out that this is not generally true. Permanently changing environ-
2ments alone do not suﬃce to make the optimizer better oﬀ. Rather, it depends (i) on
how sensitive players’ actions depend on each other and (ii) on the size of environmen-
tal shocks whether the payoﬀ advantage of imitators prevails in changing environments.
Here, we unfold a trade-oﬀ between the degree of interaction and the size of environ-
mental shocks.
Optimizers do better if the degree of interaction is suﬃciently small (for some given
set of environmental states). In the limit where the degree of interaction is zero this
becomes palpable. In this limit, both ﬁrms will act like independent monopolists, serving
separate but identical markets. On the one hand, the myopic optimizer will always
choose the payoﬀ-maximizing quantity, a monopolist would choose. This quantity will
no longer depend on what the imitator did in the previous period, precisely because the
degree of interaction is zero. On the other hand, the imitator will pick the quantity
that the optimizer chose in the previous period, which would have been optimal in that
period. Obviously, the imitator will always earn strictly less payoﬀ than the optimizer
(whenever the diﬀerent environmental state implies a diﬀerent monopolistic quantity).
Thus, for some given environment, the optimizer will be better oﬀ, whenever interaction
is suﬃciently weak.
While the intuition is straightforward if interaction is weak, the picture becomes
blurred when we address the reverse question. It is not at all clear whether there exists
an environment for any degree of interaction such that the optimizer outperforms the
imitator. To answer this question, we provide an upper boundary on the degree of
interaction such that for all lower degrees the question can be answered in the positive.
Introducing changing environments, we have to decide on how to model the envi-
ronmental space. We impose a natural assumption and restrict attention to irreducible
environments. The main reason is that reducible environments, as the name suggests,
can be decomposed into irreducible components, which then can be studied separately.
To prepare the analysis of stochastic environments, we start with investigating deter-
ministic environments. Irreducibility implies that cost and/or demand functions follow a
cyclical pattern that is independent from the starting-point. We show that, in this case,
the dynamic process globally converges to a unique limit cycle and that, from some pe-
riod on, the optimizer earns higher payoﬀ every period. Contrary to most of the existing
literature, such as referenced above, this represents a situation where there is selection
pressure against the imitator. Therefore, this preliminary result already indicates that
one critical assumption behind the advantage of imitation is a stable environment.
However, the assumption of a deterministically changing environment is compara-
tively strong. To give strength to our result, we proceed with analyzing the stochastic
case. We show that long-run average per-period payoﬀ is higher for the optimizer than
for the imitator. Hence our claim that changes in the environment typically imply selec-
tion pressure against imitative behavior does not only hold true for cyclically changing
environments, but applies to more general, stochastic environments. To establish this
r e s u l t ,w eh a v et oi m p o s ear e s t r i c t i o no nt h es e to ff e a s i b l ep a y o ﬀ parameters, capturing
the above-mentioned trade-oﬀ between the degree of interaction and the size of environ-
mental shocks. Optimizers earn higher payoﬀ than imitators if interaction is suﬃciently
3weak or shocks are suﬃciently large.
To establish our main result, we rely heavily on the theory of Markov chains. In
particular, we show that introducing a stochastic environment with ﬁnitely many states
suﬃces to make an otherwise deterministic process ergodic. Our setup, with uncountable
state space and no mutations does not allow us to apply the well-known ergodicity
theorems directly, in contrast to what is typically the case in the literature (cf. e.g.
Kandori et al 1993, Young, 1993 and Vega-Redondo, 1997). In this literature, random
mutations and/or experimentation induce ergodicity of the stochastic process. As a
further obstacle, our process does not satisfy the (weak) Feller property on the whole
state space. It will become clear from the proof of our main theorem that this intuitively
is due to the imitator’s response being discontinuous on one of the zero proﬁt lines. In
consequence, we cannot apply the standard ergodicity theorems (cf. e.g. Stokey and
Lucas, 1989, chap. 12).
The main step in establishing the material advantage of optimizers in changing en-
vironments is then to ﬁnd a recurrent absorbing subset of the state space on which the
optimizer earns strictly higher payoﬀ than the imitator and that will be reached in an
uniformly expected ﬁnite number of periods from all states outside this set. It follows
that, on this subset, the imitator’s response becomes a continuous function of the op-
timizers previous quantity. Hence, even though the process deﬁned on the whole state
space does not possess the (weak) Feller property, its restriction on the absorbing set
turns out to be a T-chain — a much stronger property than the Feller property.
Notice that it is not at all clear whether any such decomposition exists. Searching
for a decomposition, we encounter a number of trade-oﬀs. For instance, if we make
the absorbing set — in whatever sense — too small, then it might loose its characteristic
property. On the other hand, if it is taken too large in order to make sure it is absorbing
then the process might not satisfy the other desired properties, such as e.g. the (weak)
Feller property. Similarly, if the set is chosen too small then the process might spend
t o om u c ht i m ei ni t sc o m p l e m e n ts e t . Thus, one insight of our results below is that it
is actually possible to ﬁnd a decomposition, where the optimizer realizes higher payoﬀ
than the imitator on some recurrent absorbing subset of the state space.
To our knowledge, the only other papers in the (evolutionary) literature that examine
the dynamic interaction between diﬀerent behavioral rules in a changing environment
are Gale and Rosenthal (1999), its sequel Gale and Rosenthal (2001) and Rhode and
Stegeman (2001). The papers by Gale and Rosenthal study the interaction between one
single experimenter and a ﬁnite number of imitators. While the experimenter randomly
searches for a better strategy, the imitators adjust towards the average action of other
agents. This sharply contrasts with our behavioral rule of imitation in that it is not
related to success. (According to our behavioral rule of imitation, the imitator adopts
the most successful action of the previous period.)
Both in our paper and in the two papers of Gale and Rosenthal, assuming a random
environment makes the overall process ergodic. In contrast to Gale and Rosenthal,
however, we get two important properties without relying on random experimentation.
First, in terms of Gale and Rosenthal, our overall process is stable in the large. That
4is, it converges with probability one to the aforementioned absorbing subset of the state
space. Second, it is unstable in the small: Any small subset of the absorbing set is left
with probability one. The latter result is of course trivial, as it is a direct consequence of
our focus on changing environments. Interestingly, a changing environment thus suﬃces
to obtain these two properties.
Finally, Rhode and Stegeman (2001) examine a model where two players interact
within an environment of changing quadratic payoﬀ functions. In the main part of the
paper, each player imitates the most successful previous action. Additionally, random
noise (interpreted as imperfect control over the strategic variable) superimposes on action
adjustment. In their appendix B, Rhode and Stegeman present simulations where two
players with diﬀerent behavioral rules — one imitator and one so-called econometrician —
interact within an occasionally changing environment. The econometrician regresses the
payoﬀ function on all strategies observed in the past, relying on the correct parameter
speciﬁcation. Among other results they report the following (p. 451): ”In particular,
imitators tended to do well when structural changes were large and [random noise was]
small. [...] As structural changes became larger, it was always better to be an imitator.”
The authors conclude that ”imitation may be more proﬁtable than apparently more
sophisticated learning rules, in the presence of frequent structural change”.
A ﬁrst objection to Rhode and Stegeman’s conclusion would of course challenge
whether the adopted version of an ”econometrician” is meaningful within a world of
changing payoﬀs. Rather than elaborating on this criticism, we have chosen to stress
the informational diﬀerences between imitative behavior and myopic optimization. It
turns out that imitation is less proﬁtable compared to the arguably more sophisticated
learning rule of myopic optimization if interaction takes place in permanently changing
environments and if structural changes are large. In that case, sophistication pays oﬀ.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline the model, while section 3
contains the analysis. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2. The model
2.1. The stage game
We consider the following symmetric two-player game with players O and I.E v e r y
period t ∈ N0, each player chooses an action q ∈ Q := [0,q]. Given the action proﬁle


















represents player I’s payoﬀ. Focussing on strategic substitutability, we assume π11 >
π12 > 0a n dπ1 > 0.
52.2. Changing environments
To model a changing environment, let payoﬀ parameter π1 follow a Markov process
with state space Θ = {θ1,...,θH},H ≥ 2, and strictly ordered states, 0 < θ1 <...<
θH ≤ q. Let H := {1,...,H}, be the corresponding index set. If no ambuigity arises,
we sometimes refer to h ∈ H as the environmental state θh. For simplicity, we ﬁxt h e
remaining environmental parameters π11,π12, and π0. With slight abuse of notation, we
write θt to denote the environmental state in period t ∈ N.
The environmental process can be completely described by its transition matrix R =
(rij)(i,j)∈H2.T h en u m b e r srij represent the probability of reaching environmental state
j ∈ H in the next period if the current environmental state is i ∈ H,i . e .rij =P r {θt+1 =
θj|θt = θi}. Observe that, by the Markov property, these probabilities do not depend on











∈ X be an arbitrary initial state at time
t =0 .
As we intend to contrast our results with those obtained by other authors for the
case of a stable environment, we focus on the polar opposite case. We suppose that the
environment is never identical in two subsequent periods. We impose:
Assumption (CE): Let R =( rij)(i,j)∈H2 be the transition matrix of the envi-
ronmental process. Then we assume rii = 0 for all i ∈ H.
Given the environment-dependent payoﬀ parameter π1,b o t hp l a y e r s ’p a y o ﬀ functions









2 /2 − π12q
Oq
I + θtq
n + π0, for n = O,I.
The following example illustrates the meaning of a changing environment for the case of
Cournot duopoly.
Example 1. (Cournot duopoly). Suppose two ﬁrms engage in Cournot competition.
Let qn ∈ Q, n = O,I, denote the quantity produced by ﬁrm n where the cost of pro-
duction qn is C(qn)=c2 (qn)
2 + c1qn + c0. Inverse demand is p(qO,qI)=a − b(qO + qI).














2 (b + c2)+q
n (a − c1) − bq
Oq
I − c0, for n = O,I,
where θ = a−c1 > 0 and (π11,π12,π0)=( 2( b + c2),b,−c0). Accordingly, changes in the
environmental state θ represent shocks in the maximum willingness to pay, a, and/or
marginal cost, c1. Since θ changes over time, the payoﬀ function is time-dependent.
2.3. Adjustment rules
Every period t, both players update their previous action from period t − 1. In this
paper we investigate the interaction between two types of action adjustment or learning
rules. While player O plays a (myopic) best response to the previous action of player
I, taking into account the current state of the environment, player I chooses the action
that earned highest payoﬀ in the previous period.
6Deﬁnition 1. (Optimization) A player adjusting by myopic optimization chooses his











where ρ := π12
π11 and θt ∈ Θ.
Recall that the slope of the reaction curve, 0 < ρ < 1, measures the degree of
interaction between players. In case ρ is close to zero the degree of interaction between
p l a y e r si sw e a k ,a n dv i c ev e r s af o rρ close to one.














Notice that we assume an imitator sticks to his strategy if and only if he has realized a
strictly higher payoﬀ. The mere purpose of this assumption is to simplify the exposition




some positive probability, when both players realized the same payoﬀ in the previous
period, i.e. when uO
t−1 = uI
t−1. This would not aﬀect our results.
To determine the imitator’s behavior, we characterize which of the two players earns
higher payoﬀ, given some arbitrary state x ∈ X.






































































F i g u r e1r e p r e s e n t st h ep l a n eo ft h et w op l a y e r s ’q u a n t i t i e sf o ra n yﬁxed environmental
state θ ∈ Θ. With varying θ, this gives the overall state space X. Observe that qO is
depicted on the vertical axis, while qI corresponds to the horizontal one. The ﬁgure also
contains the best response curve, according to which the optimizer updates his action.
The line qO = qI indicates the response of the imitator, whenever the optimizer realizes
higher payoﬀ. Finally, the ﬁgure displays the four relative payoﬀ regions, which result
from the two zero relative payoﬀ lines qO = qI and qO + qI = 2θ




) , ( i


















I o u u <
I o q q =
I o u u >
I o u u <
Figure 1: The action space and relative payoﬀ
2.4. The overall process
The overall process is completely described by the environmental transition matrix R and
adjustment rules (O) and (I). It induces a time-homogeneous Markov chain on the overall
state space X = Q2 × Θ, with corresponding σ−ﬁeld B(X). The following proposition
states that the overall transition function, implicitly deﬁned by Deﬁnitions 1, 2 and the
environmental Markov chain on Θ, represents a transition probability kernel or Markov
transition function.
Proposition 1. Let P = {P (x,A),x ∈ X, A ∈ B(X)} be given by (O), (I) and the
Markov chain on Θ. Then
i) for each A ∈ B(X),P(x,A) is a non-negative measurable function on X, and
ii) for each x ∈ X, P (x,·) is a probability measure on B(X).
Proof. The claims can easily be established using techniques supplied in Schenk-
Hopp´ e (1997, Prop. 1).
Given the one-step transition probability kernel from Proposition 1, we can re-
cursively deﬁne the corresponding n-step transition probability kernal (cp. Meyn and
Tweedie, 1996, p.67). We set P 0 (x,A): =δx (A), the Dirac measure deﬁned by
δx(A): =
½
1i f x ∈ A
0i f x/ ∈ A ,







where x ∈ X and A ∈ B(X). Intuitively, P 1 (x,A)=P (x,A) represents the transition
probability of reaching the set A ∈ B(X) when starting in state x ∈ X in the previous
period. Similarly, Pn (x,A) is the probability of reaching A in precisely n periods,
starting in x ∈ X in period 0. By the Markov property we have
Pr{xt+n ∈ A | xt = x} = P
n (x,A), ∀t ≥ 0.
Observe that the general process does not have the (weak) Feller property. This is
due to the imitator’s response being discontinuous on the relative payoﬀ lines qO +qI =
2θ
π11,θ ∈ Θ. As a consequence, we cannot directly apply standard decomposition results to
show uniqueness of an invariant distribution. Fortunately, however, we can circumvent
the problem for the important class of irreducible environments.
3. Irreducible environments
Focussing on irreducible environments, this section provides a suﬃcient condition on the
environment such that, from some period on, the optimizer always realizes higher payoﬀ
than the imitator. This contrasts with most of the existing literature1 in that it represents
a situation displaying selection pressure against the imitator. We thus conclude that one
critical assumption behind the advantage of imitation is a stable environment.
To prove this result, we develop a new decomposition technique, which — to our
knowledge — has not been used in the economic literature so far. Notice that the overall
process on state space X does not satisfy the (weak) Feller property. Basically this
is due to the imitator’s response being discontinuous on the zero relative payoﬀ lines
qO + qI =
2θh
π11 (h ∈ H). As a consequence, we cannot apply standard decomposition
results to show uniqueness of an invariant distribution.
Our decomposition technique, however, allows to circumvent the problem. The basic
idea is to ﬁnd a decomposition of the state space into two disjoint subsets, X = b X ∪ b XC,
such that the process satisﬁes the following two conditions. First, the complement set
b XC is uniformly transient. I.e., there exists a uniform upper boundary on the expected
occupation time of b XC, i.e. applying to all x ∈ b XC. This uniform upper boundary then
implies that the process will occupy b XC only for an expected ﬁnite number of periods.
Second, having reached b X, the process always remains in b X and the optimizer earns
strictly higher payoﬀ than the imitator. By the latter, the imitator’s response is no
longer discontinuous on the zero relative payoﬀ line, entailing that the process, restricted
to b X, satisﬁes the (weak) Feller property. More speciﬁcally, we can show that the
restricted process constitutes a ϕ−irreducible aperiodic positive Harris chain. It follows
1See e.g., Conlisk (1980), Rhode and Stegeman (2001), Schipper (2001), and Droste, Hommes, and
Tuinstra (2002).
9that the restricted process has all the desired properties such as uniqueness of an invariant
distribution, the strong law of large numbers and ergodicity.
To derive b X, we put a restriction on the size of shocks reﬂecting a trade-oﬀ between
the degree of interaction — measured by the slope of the reaction function — and the size
of shocks in the environment. This trade-oﬀ can be put in two ways. First, for any
(ﬁnite) set of environmental states the optimizer will be better oﬀ (than the imitator) if
the degree of interaction is suﬃciently weak. Secondly, given some (not too high) degree
of interaction, there always exists a minimum size of environmental shocks such that (for
larger shocks) the optimizer outperforms the imitator.
Finally, recall that an irreducible ﬁnite environment is one where the environmental
process reaches every environmental state from every other environmental state with
positive probability. Since the environmental state space is ﬁnite, irreducibility implies
positive recurrence, i.e. the environmental process returns to every environmental state
with probability one.
We proceed as follows. In subsection 3.1, we provide the restriction and decompose
the state space into two sets, X = b X ∪ b XC.L e m m a2s h o w st h a t b X is absorbing and
that the optimizer earns strictly higher payoﬀ on b X. Lemma 3 establishes that b XC
is uniformly transient. To derive the stochastic properties of the restricted process, it
is helpful ﬁrst to analyze the case of deterministic environments, which is the core of
subsection 3.2. Subsequently, subsection 3.3 examines the stochastic properties of the
restricted process. In subsection 3.4, we analyze relative long-run average payoﬀ.T o
this end, we construct an environmental co-chain, which allows us to derive upper and
lower boundaries on long-run average payoﬀ.
3.1. State space decomposition
The following assumption mirrors the trade-oﬀ between the degree of interaction, ρ, and
the size of shocks in the environment.
Assumption (E) Let Θ = {θ1,...,θH}, θ1 <...<θH, denote the state space
and refer to the slope of the reaction function, ρ = π12
π11, as the degree of interaction.
Then we assume that
θh+1 − θh > 2ρθH, for all h ∈ H\{ H}. (E)
Notice that summing up these inequalities implies θH −θ1 > 2ρ(H −1)θH. Moreover,
in the equidistant case Θ = Θθ := {θ,2θ,...,Hθ}, condition (E) becomes equivalent to
ρ < 1/(2H). Therefore, H = 2 provides an upper boundary on ρ, namely ρ =1 /4, such
that for any ρ < ρ there exists an environment Θ satisfying condition (E).
We start with decomposing the state space X into two subsets b X and b XC such that b X
is absorbing and b XC is uniformly transient. First we construct b X from single pairwisely
disjoint sets, b Xij. Part iii) of Lemma 2 below establishes that, from some period on, the
process (xt)t≥0 will visit these sets b Xij if and only if the previous environmental state
was θt−1 = θi and the current environmental state is θt = θj. Recall that we focus on
changing environments. Accordingly, only transitions (i → j)w i t hj 6= i are of interest,
10since transitions (i → i) have zero probability under the environmental process. The
following index set J = {(i,j) ∈ H2 : j 6= i} reﬂects this observation.















π11;θh)a n dqh := BR(0;θh) for h ∈ H. To construct b X from the sets





Lemma 2 summarizes the properties of b X.
Lemma 2. i) The sets b Xij ((i,j) ∈ J) form a partition of b X, i.e., b Xij ∩ b Xi0j0 = ∅,
for i 6= i0 or j 6= j0 (and b X =
S
(i,j)∈J b Xij, which is true by deﬁnition).
ii) On b X, the optimizer realizes higher payoﬀ than the imitator, i.e., uO(x) >u I(x)
for all x =( qO,qI,θ) ∈ b X.
iii) b X is absorbing.
iv) If xT ∈ b X for some T<∞,t h e nxt+1 ∈ b Xij ⇐⇒ (θt = i and θt+1 = j), for all
t>Tand all (i,j) ∈ J.
Proof. See Appendix.
Second, we decompose the complement set of b X in X, w h i c hw ed e n o t eb y b XC :=
X \ b X.T ot h i se n d ,w ed e ﬁne the following ”level” sets:
X1 :=
½







































,θ = θh,x / ∈ b X
¾
.
The following Lemma shows that (i) the sets X1,...,X 4 form a partition of b XC; (ii)
having left any level set Xi (for some level i =1 ,...,4), the process will never return
to any lower level set Xj,j≤ i; and (iii) the complement set b XC is uniformly transient.
T h el a s tr e s u l ti m p l i e st h a tt h ea b s o r b i n gs e t b X i sr e a c h e dw i t h i na ne x p e c t e dﬁnite
number of periods.
11Lemma 3. i) The four sets X1,...,X4 form a partition of the complement set b XC.
ii) Set X5 := b X. Then ∪5
i=kXi is absorbing for any k =1 ,...,5.
iii) b XC is uniformly transient.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proof of Lemma 3 iii) provides an upper boundary on the expected occupation
time of b XC that holds for all starting points x0 ∈ b XC. Notice that restricting the set
of feasible starting-points to — in whatever sense — economically reasonable ones, would
allow to reduce this boundary.
Leaving b XC in an expected ﬁnite number of periods, it is clearly warranted to in-
vestigate the properties of the process that is restricted to the absorbing set b X.T h i si s
the core of the following two subsections. We start with analyzing the special case of an
irreducible deterministic environment, before turning towards aperiodic environments.
3.2. Deterministic environments
The main purpose of investigating irreducible deterministic environments is to prepare
the analysis of the subsequent subsection. To this end, we show that in deterministic
environments behavior of the myopic optimizer and the imitator converges to a unique
limit cycle. As a by-product we obtain the quantities chosen by the optimizer and the
imitator along that limit cycle.
Notice that imposing deterministic transitions on the irreducible environmental pro-
cess entails a cyclically changing environment. Since irreducibility implies that all en-
vironmental states can be reached from each other with positive probability, this cycle
must be unique and visit all environmental states. Correspondingly, the length of the
cycle coincides with the number of environmental states.
We ﬁrst deﬁne deterministic environments and then state our results. Recall, (i) that
R =( rij)(i,j)∈H2 denotes the transition matrix of the environmental (Markov) process
(θt)t≥0, (ii) that the set of environmental states, Θ = {θ1,...,θH}, is strictly ordered,
i.e. θ1 <. . .<θH, and (iii) that H = {1,...,H} represents the corresponding index
set.
Deﬁnition 3. We call the environment deterministic if and only if for each environmen-
tal state, h ∈ H, t h e r ee x i s t sau n i q u es u c c e s s o r ,s(h): =h0 ∈ H, such that rhh0 =1 .
Obviously, it follows from the assumption of changing environments, (CE), that
s(h) 6= h for all h ∈ H. Moreover, as mentioned above, an irreducible, deterministic
process (with ﬁnite state space) must in fact form a unique cycle of length H.T h e
following notaton takes account of this observation.
Deﬁne the (k+1):th successor to (the smallest) environmental state θ1 recursively as
follows: Set sk+1(θ1): =s(sk(θ1)) for k =0 ,...,H− 1a n ds0(θ1): =θ1. Irreducibility
implies that (θ1,s 1(θ1)...,s H−1(θ1)) constitutes a permutation of Θ. We then relabel
the states to capture their order of appearance along the cycle, i.e. we set e θh := sh−1(θ1)
12for all h ∈ H and e Θ = {e θ1,...,e θH}. Obviously, we have s(e θH)=e θ1.N o t i c et h a tw ed o
not impose any order on subsequent states of the cycle, i.e., it may be that e θh > e θh+1
for some h ∈ H\{ H}. Finally, we paste two cycles to the left and one the right of e Θ,
i.e., we set e θh+H := e θh−H := e θh−2H := e θh for all h ∈ H.
We can now state the main result of this subsection.
Proposition 2. Suppose the environment is irreducible and deterministic. Then, from
all starting points x0 =( qO
0 ,qI
0,θ0) ∈ X, the process converges to a unique limit cycle,
(x∗
1,...,x ∗
H). This cycle can be completely characterized by the optimizers quantities
(q∗
1,...,q∗
H) since, starting on the cycle, an optimizer chooses qO
t = q∗
h if and only if θt =
e θh, while the imitator is always one period behind, playing qI
t = qO
t−1. Correspondingly,
we can write the cycle as x∗
1 := (q∗
1,q∗
H,e θ1) and x∗
h := (q∗
h,q∗
h−1,e θh) for h ∈ H\{ 1}.










ke θh−2k for h ∈ H. (3.1)









ke θh−2k for h ∈ H. (3.2)
Proof. See Appendix.
Notice that the order of actions along the limit cycle, (q∗
1,...,q∗
H), corresponds with
the order of states along the environmental cycle (e θ1,...,e θH).
The proof of Proposition 2 is divided into two parts. First we establish that, for
deterministic environments, the property of b XC being uniformly transient transforms
into a lower boundary of 2H + 6 periods, after which the process has left the set b XC
with certainty. The second part then deals with its behavior in b X, where the process
remains the rest of the time. Having reached b X, the optimizer always realizes strictly
higher payoﬀ than the imitator, uO >u I, inducing the imitator to mimic the optimizer’s
previous action. In fact, this means that the optimizer plays a best response to his own









These two-period steps imply that two cases of behavioral cycles can occur, depending
on whether the number of environmental states, H, is even or odd. In the former case,
we have min{k ≥ 1:s2k(θt)=θt} = H/2. In contrast, if H is odd, then min{k ≥ 1:
s2k(θt)=θt} = H. Notice that both statements hold true for any t ≥ 0.
Correspondingly, if H is even, then the limit cycle comprises two independent cycles
each of length H/2, whereas for H being odd, there is only one cycle of length H.I nt h e
13former case, the two cycles can again involve an even or odd number of states, depending
on whether H/2 is even or odd. This explains why the feedback of the last time that
quantity q∗




















(For notational simplicity, q∗
h−H := q∗
h+H := q∗
h (for h ∈ H) pastes the cycle to the left




Turning towards the case of aperiodic (and hence ergodic) environments, the following
theorem shows that ergodicity of the environment suﬃces to make an otherwise deter-
ministic process of behavioral adjustment ergodic as well.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose the environmental process is irreducible and aperiodic. Then
the restriction of P on b X, Pb X, constitutes a ϕ−irreducible aperiodic positive Harris
chain.
Proof. See Appendix.





for any A ∈ B( b X).







t(x,·) − µk =0 ,
where kνk := supf:|f|≤1 |v(f)| =s u p A∈B( b X) v(A) − infA∈B( b X) v(A) denotes the total
variation norm.
iii) Let µ(g): =Eµ[g(x0)] be the steady state expectation, corresponding to the invari-
ant measure µ. Then, the Law of Large Numbers holds for any function g satisfying








14Proof. Results i) - iii) follow from Theorems 10.0.1, 13.3.1 and 17.0.1 (Meyn and
Tweedie, 1996), respectively.
According to iii), the historical frequencies with which a certain subset, A ∈ B( b X),
has been visited in the past converge to the probability mass that the invariant dis-
tribution µ assigns to A. (To see this, set g(xτ): =IA(xτ), the indicator function
associated with the set A ∈ B( b X).) Similarly, average per-period payoﬀ and relative
average per-period payoﬀ converge to their respective steady state expectations. Let
gn(xτ): =un(xτ),n= I,O, and grel(xτ): =uO(xτ) − uI(xτ) denote these payoﬀs, re-




τ=1 gn(xτ)=µ(gn), for n = I,O,rel. Note
that we can apply the corollary, since all gn(·) are bounded on b X.
3.4. Long-run average payoﬀs
As noted earlier, Lemmas 2 and 3 characterizes the behavior of the process. In particular
statement iv) in Lemma 2 implies that the process only visits those subsets b Xij with
rij > 0. We introduce the index set, b J := {(i,j) ∈ H2 : rij > 0}, which encompasses
precisely these subsets. Because of rii =0f o ra l li ∈ H, we have that b J ⊂ J. Moreover,
statement iv) of Lemma 2 allows to describe the original process’ transitions between
these subsets b Xij by a much simpler Markov co-chain with state space b J and transition
probabilities R b J =( r(i,j),(i0,j0))(i,j),(i0,j0)∈ b J such that
r(i,j),(i0,j0) =
½
rjj0 if j = i0 and
0o t h e r w i s e .
Theorem 3.2 below states that the co-chain on b J, deﬁned by R b J, is irreducible and
(positive) recurrent. By standard results from ﬁnite state space Markov chain theory,
the co-chain then has a unique invariant distribution and the strong law of large numbers
applies (cf. e.g. Resnick, 1994, sec. 2).
Theorem 3.2. Suppose the environmental process is irreducible. Then the co-chain
on b J deﬁned by R b J is irreducible and positive recurrent. It has a unique invariant
distribution µ
b J and, for any bounded function g : b J → R and any starting point












(i,j)∈ b J g(i,j)µ
b J
(i,j).
Proof. We only establish irreducibility of the co-chain on b J. Positive recurrence
follows from b J being ﬁnite.
We have to show that for any (i,j),(i0,j0) ∈ b J, there exists a ﬁnite path b P :=
{(i0,j 0),(i1,j 1),...,(iT,j T)} ⊂ b J such that (i0,j 0)=( i,j), (iT,j T)=( i0,j0), and
r(it−1,jt−1),(it,jt) > 0f o ra l lt =1 ,...,T.
15Let (i,j),(i0,j0) ∈ b J be arbitrary. If j = i0 we are done, because (i0,j0) ∈ b J implies
r(i,j),(i0,j0) = rjj0 = ri0j0 > 0. On the other hand, if j 6= i0 then, by irreducibility of the
environmental process, there exists a path P = {h0,h 1,...,h T} ⊂ H such that h0 = j,
hT = i0 and rht−1ht > 0f o ra l lt =1 ,...,T.Set b P := {(i0,j 0),(i1,j 1),...,(iT,j T)} where
(i0,j 0): =( i,h0), (it,j t): =( ht−1,h t) for t =1 ,...,T−1a n d ,ﬁnally, (iT,j T): =( hT,j0).
By construction of b P,w eh a v er(it−1,jt−1),(it,jt) = rjt−1jt = rht−1ht > 0 for all t =1 ,...,T,
which completes the proof.
If the environment is deterministic, then, by Proposition 2, the process (xτ)τ∈N0
converges to a unique limit cycle, (x∗
1,...,x ∗
H). This cycle is characterized by equations
(3.1) or (3.2) and allows us to calculate long-run average per-period payoﬀ to both the
optimizer and the imitator and hence long-run relative average per-period payoﬀ .
Theorem 3.3. Suppose the environment is deterministic, let (x∗
1,...,x ∗
H) denote the

















h) > 0, (3.4)
i.e. long-run average per-period payoﬀ is strictly higher to the optimizer than to the
imitator. Moreover, from some period on, the optimizer earns strictly higher payoﬀ than
the imitator in every period.
Proof. The last claim follows from Proposition 2 and Lemma 2, since the process











































where the second equality holds true, because each of the limits in the paranthese exists
by Proposition 2 and Cauchy’s limit theorem. Finally, the right-hand side of (3.4) is







h)], since b J corresponds to the limit cycle
e Θ = {e θ1,...,e θH} = {θκ1,...,θκH} in that b J = {(κ1,κ2)),...,(κH−1,κH),(κH,κ1)}




A similar result obtains for the case of aperiodic stochastic environments. In addition,
Theorem 3.2 allows us to provide an upper and a lower boundary on the long-run relative
average per-period payoﬀ.
16Let gmax(i,j): =m a x {grel(x):x ∈ b Xij} and gmin(i,j): =m i n {grel(x):x ∈ b Xij}
denote maximum and minimum relative payoﬀ in b Xij, respectively, for (i,j) ∈ b J .S i n c e
grel(·) is continuous and each b Xij is compact, this notation is well deﬁned. Moreover, let
g := min(i,j)∈ b J gmin(i,j).
Theorem 3.4. Suppose the environmental process is irreducible and aperiodic. Then










where Eµ[grel] denotes the steady state expectation, corresponding to the invariant mea-






min] ≥ g > 0. (3.6)
Proof. First, equality (3.5) follows from the corollary, part iii). Second, the strict
inequality in (3.6) holds true by part ii) of Lemma 2. To see this, notice that grel(x) > 0




min(i,j)= m i n
(i,j)∈ b J
min{g
rel(x):x ∈ b Xij} > 0,
since b X is compact and grel(·) is continuous. Third, the last weak inequality in (3.6)
holds true because of g ≤ gmin(i,j), for all (i,j) ∈ b J .
Finally, to establish the remaining inequalities in (3.6), we make use of the co-chain
P b J.L e tι(x) denote the index function assigning the set b Xij to any x ∈ b X, i.e., ι(x)=ij
if and only if x ∈ b Xij.N o t i c et h a tgmax(ι(xt)) ≥ grel(xt) ≥ gmin(ι(xt)), for any sample

























































which completes the proof.
To illustrate the role of Assumption (E), we reconsider the example of Cournot com-
petition.
17Example 2. (Cournot duopoly continued). Recall that shocks were represented
by changes in θ = a − c1 > 0 and that ρ = b/(2(b + c2)).N o t i c e t h a t ρ =0(or
b = π12 =0 ) corresponds to the polar case of two independent monopolists.
Let Θ = {θ1,...,θH} with 0 < θ1 < ... < θH denote the environmental state space.
Then Assumption (E) requires
θh+1 − θh > 2ρθH =
b
b + c2
θH, for all h ∈ H\{ H}. (3.8)
As mentioned above, condition (3.8) mirrors a trade-oﬀ between the degree of interaction,
ρ, on the one hand and the minimum size of shocks, θ := min{θh+1 −θh : h ∈ H\{H}},
on the other hand. In the context of Cournot duopoly, the former is related to both the
degree of convexity, given by c2, and to how responsive market price is to changes in
market quantity, reﬂected in b.
On the one hand, for any ﬁxed set of environmental states Θ, there exists a minimum
degree of convexity c2 (given some b) such that Assumption (E) is satisﬁed for all c>c 2
(where c2 solves θ(b +c2)=bθH). Alternatively, given some c2, there exists a maximum
degree of price responsiveness b such that Assumption (E) applies for all b<b (let b
solve θ(b + c2)=bθH).
On the other hand, for any ﬁxed degree of convexity, c2,a n da n yﬁxed degree of price
responsiveness, b, resulting in some ρ < ρ, there exists an environment Θ and a minimum
size of shocks, bθH/(b + c2), such that Assumption (E) holds true for all larger shocks,
i.e. if θ >b θH/(b + c2).
In any of these cases, it follows from Theorems 3.3 and 3.4 that the optimizer earns
strictly higher payoﬀ than the imitator and hence experiences a relative evolutionary
advantage.
We conclude this section by discussing the role of Assumption (E). Apparently, As-
sumption (E) is suﬃcient to establish our results in this section. To address whether is
also necessary, let us check ﬁrst where it enters the analysis.
First, we use Assumption (E) to show that the set X2 will be left in H+1periodswith
strictly positive probability. In the proof, however, we only need that θH − θ1 > ρθH.
This obviously represents a weaker condition than provided by assumption (E), for (E)
implies θH − θ1 > 2ρ(H − 1)θH.
Second, Assumption (E) entails qh <q
h+1 for all h ∈ H\{H} and hence b Xij∩ b Xi0j0 = ∅
for i 6= i0 or j 6= j0. To guarantee these properties, we could get by on a slightly weaker
condition, namely,
θh+1 − θh > ρθH, for all h ∈ H\{ H}. (E0)
In addition, condition (E0)w o u l da l s ob es u ﬃcient for θH − θ1 > ρθH.
Third and ﬁnally, we employ Assumption (E) to show that, on b X, the optimizer
realizes higher payoﬀ than the imitator. In this case, Assumption (E) is necessary to
derive that uO(x) >u I(x) applies for all x =( qO,qI,θ) ∈ b X. To see this, let us drop the
18assumption and replace it by condition (E0). It follows that there exists some h ∈ H\{H}
such that ρθH < θh+1 −θh ≤ 2ρθH. Consider b x := (b qO,b qI,b θ): =( q
h,q
h+1,θh). Obviously,
we have b x ∈ b Xh+1,h and b qO ≤ qh <q
h+1 ≤ b qI. Moreover, it follows from π11q
i = θi−ρθH
that π11(b qO+b qI)=θh+θh+1−2ρθH ≤ 0. Hence, by Lemma 1, we obtain uO(b x) ≤ uI(b x).
Of course, our last observation does not mean that Assumption (E) is necessary to
establish the results in this section. It only says that our technique of establishing the
results requires assumption (E). However, notice that, without Assumption (E), even the
restricted process will no longer display the (weak) Feller property, since the imitator’s
response will be discontinuous again. It will be diﬃcult to overcome this problem.
4. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to analyze the dynamic interaction between imitators
and optimizers in a changing environment. To this end, we put forward a symmetric
quadratic two-player game, recurrently played by one imitator and one myopic optimizer
within an environment of a changing marginal payoﬀ parameter. Restricting attention
to permanently changing environments, we looked at the polar opposite case of a stable
environment in order to create an as stark contrast as possible. To prepare the later anal-
ysis, we start with considering the special case of deterministically cycling environments.
In these types of environments, the dynamic process globally converges to a unique limit
cycle. After some ﬁnite number of periods, the process enters a subset of the state space,
b X, on the entire of which the optimizer earns higher payoﬀ than the imitator. Subse-
quently, we investigated the more interesting case of aperiodic stochastic environments.
Here, the same subset b X turns out to be the core element of the analysis. Starting from
an arbitrary state of the dynamics, the process enters b X within an expected ﬁnite num-
ber of periods. We provided a uniform upper boundary on this number. Earning higher
payoﬀ on b X than the imitator, the optimizer is again better oﬀ.T h u s ,b o t h s c e n a r i o s
represent situations in which there is selection pressure against the imitator.
Our results rely on a number of assumptions on which we will comment now. First
and most importantly, we have to put a restriction on the environment capturing a
trade-oﬀ between the size of environmental shocks on the one hand and the degree of in-
teraction (=slope of the reaction function) on the other. Only if interaction is suﬃciently
weak or environmental shocks are suﬃciently large, the optimizer will be better oﬀ.W e
illustrated this assumption by means of a quadratic duopoly game displaying strategic
substitutes. In this context, the size of environmental shocks translates into shocks in
the diﬀerence between consumers’ maximum willingness to pay and a marginal cost pa-
rameter. Similarly, the degree of interaction relates to responsiveness of the market price
and convexity in cost. Interaction is weak, if convexity is strong or if responsiveness is
low. Correspondingly, the following circumstances will support the evolutionary advan-
tage of optimizing behavior: highly convex cost or weakly responsive demand (implying
a low degree of interaction) and/or large changes in the diﬀerence between maximum
willingness to pay and marginal cost (meaning large shocks). One application ﬁtting to
our framework would be the economically important example of business cycles.
19Second, focussing on irreducible environments, we only examined deterministic and
aperiodic stochastic environments. While irreducibility represents a natural assumption,
as we reasoned in the introduction of Section 3, it remains an open question what we can
say with regard to periodic stochastic environments. As to these types of environments
we encounter the problem that, in general, we do not know whether long-run payoﬀ
converges at all. Standard results for the case of countable state spaces indicate that it
does so. However, even without knowing this, we have established that the absorbing set
b X w i l lb er e a c h e di na ne x p e c t e dﬁnite number of periods and that, on b X, the optimizer
earns strictly higher payoﬀ. Thus, even without convergence of long-run payoﬀs, the
optimizer will always be better oﬀ, once the process has reached the absorbing set.
Third, by assuming the environmental state space to be ﬁnite, we implicitly ruled out
that the environmental process might be transient. In a sense, this excludes environments
that represent technological progress. For, if we think that technological progress results
in subsequently lower states of marginal cost and/or higher maximum willingness to
pay then the environmental process might never return to former environmental states.
As to this case, two scenarios obtain, depending on whether or not there exists an
upper boundary on the diﬀerence between marginal cost and maximum willingness to
pay. First, if the environmental state space is unbounded, then the overall process will
eventually enter a subset of the state space on which the optimizer outperforms the
imitator every period. Regarding average long-run payoﬀ per period, we again face the
problem of divergence. Second, if the environmental state space is bounded then shocks
will be eventually too small such as to make the optimizer better oﬀ than the imitator.
Under this scenario, the imitator will earn higher payoﬀ, once the size of shocks in the
environment falls below a certain threshold.
Thus, the analysis in this paper as well as our latter excursion into transient environ-
mental spaces allow us to conclude that the advantage of imitation is strongly connected
to the assumption of play taking place in a stable environment. In changing environ-
ments, optimizers do better than imitators if interaction is weak or when changes in the
environment are suﬃciently large. Both cases create selection pressure against imitative
behavior.
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21A. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2.
Part i): By construction of b X,we only have to show that b Xij∩ b Xi0j0 = ∅, for i 6= i0

































Part ii): To show uO(x) >u I(x) for all x ∈ b X, ﬁx x =( qO,qI,θ) ∈ b Xij, for any
(i,j) ∈ J.
Consider i<jﬁrst. On the one hand, x ∈ b Xij implies qI ≤ qi <q
j ≤ qO. On the
other hand, it also implies qO+qI ≤ qj +qi < 2θj/π11 =2 θ/π11. The claim hence follows
from Lemma 1.
Now consider i>j .In this case, we have qO ≤ qj <q






















where the last inequality holds true by Assumption (E). Again, the claim follows
from Lemma 1.
Part iii): To establish that b X is absorbing, suppose x = xt ∈ b X.Let s(x)=xt+1 ∈
X denote the direct successor to xt under the process induced by Deﬁnitions 1 and 2.
We have to show that s(x) ∈ b X. Similar to the above deﬁnition, let s(qO)a n ds(qI)
denote the direct successors to the optimizer’s and the imitator’s quantity, respectively.
First, x ∈ b X implies qO ∈ [q
j,qj],q I ∈ [q
i,qi]a n dθ = θj for some (i,j) ∈ J.
Let s(θj)=θk (θk 6= θj) denote the subsequent environmental state that is induced by
the environmental Markov chain. From Deﬁnition 1 it follows that s(qO)=BR(qI;θk).
Hence qI ∈ [q





Second, by part ii) we have that s(qI)=qO and hence s(qI) ∈ [q
j,qj]. It thus follows
that s(x) ∈ b X.
22Part iv): Suppose xT ∈ b X for some T<∞ and let θt = θi and θt+1 = θj for
any t>Tsuch that i 6= j. Since b X is absorbing, it follows that xt−1,x t,x t+1 ∈ b X
and hence qI
t−1,qI
t ∈ [0,θH/π11]. On the one hand, qI













which completes the proof of xt+1 ∈ b Xij.
To show the converse, ﬁx xt+1 ∈ b Xij such that t>T. Again, since b X is absorbing,
xT ∈ b X implies xt−1,x t ∈ b X. By deﬁnition of b Xij, it follows that θt+1 = θj. To show
θt = θi, notice on the one hand that xt−1 ∈ b X implies qI




h,qh], for some h 6= j. On the other hand, xt+1 ∈ b Xij implies
qI
t+1 ∈ [q




however, since the intervalls [q
k,qk]( k =1 ,...,H) are pairwisely disjoint by Assumption
(E), it must be that [q
h,qh]=[ q
i,qi], i.e. θt = θi, which completes the proof of part iv).
¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .
Part i): To show that the sets X1,...,X 4 form a partition of b XC, one has to show
that b XC = ∪4
i=1Xi and Xi ∩ Xj = ∅ for all i,j =1 ,...,4; j 6= i.
Let us establish b XC = ∪4
i=1Xi ﬁrst. Suppose x ∈ Xi for some i =1 ,...,4. If i =3
or i =4t h e nx/ ∈ b X holds true by deﬁnition of X3 and X4, respectively. For i =1
and i = 2 the claim follows because x ∈ b X implies max{qO,qI} ≤ θH/π11, whereas
max{qO,q I} > θH/π11 applies for x ∈ X1 ∪ X2. T os h o wt h eo p p o s i t ei n c l u s i o n ,ﬁx
x ∈ X such that x/ ∈ Xi for all i =1 ,...,4. First, by deﬁnition of X1 and X2,w e
have that x/ ∈ X1 ∪X2 implies max{qO,qI} ≤ θH/π11. Second, it hence follows from the
deﬁnition of X3,t h a tx ∈ X4 ∪ b X. Finally, x/ ∈ X4 implies x ∈ b X. This completes the
proof of b XC = ∪4
i=1Xi.
To see that Xi∩Xj = ∅ for all i,j =1 ,...,4; j 6= i,n o t i c et h a tx ∈ X4 implies qO ≤
θH/π11.H e n c e ,X1 ∩ X4 = ∅. The remaining intersections are empty by construction.
Part ii): Recall that X5 := b X. We have to show that ∪5
i=kXi is absorbing for any
k =1 ,...,5.
First, if k =1 , then ∪5
i=1Xi = X trivially implies xt+1 ∈ X, for any xt ∈ X. Second,
for k = 2 and arbitrary xt ∈∪ 5
































π11 that xt+1 ∈∪ 5
i=3Xi. Fourth, if k =4a n d







⊂ [0,θH/π11]. Let θt+1 = θh for some h =1 ,...,H















i.e. xt+1 ∈ X4 ∪ b X. Finally, for k =5 , the claim has been established in Lemma 2.
Part iii): We have to show that b XC is uniformly transient, i.e., ∃M<∞ :
Ex[η b XC] ≤ M for all x ∈ X, where η b XC :=
P∞
n=1 I{xn∈ b XC} denotes the number of
23visits of xn to b XC. By Proposition 8.3.1 iv) in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p.184), it is
suﬃcient to show that there exists some m ∈ Z+ such that
Px(τ b XC (m) < ∞) ≤ ε < 1f o ra l lx ∈ b X
C, (A.2)
where τ b XC (m)d e n o t e st h emth hitting time of xn to b XC. If this condition holds then
Ex[η b XC] ≤ 1+ m
1−ε for all x ∈ X, that is, b XC is uniformly transient. According to (A.2),
it suﬃces to ﬁnd a path of ﬁnite length m from b XC to b X that has probability 1 −ε > 0
under the overall process for all x ∈ b XC.
In order to derive m, we ﬁrst determine, for any set Xi (i ≤ 4), an u m b e rm(i)a n da
probability ε(i)s u c ht h a tPx(τXi (m(i)) < ∞) ≤ ε(i) < 1f o ra l lx ∈ Xi. Since ∪5
i=kXi is
absorbing for any k =1 ,...,5, w ec a nt h e nd e r i v em from the m(i)0sa sm :=
P4
i=1 m(i).
Moreover, an upper boundary ε < 1 satisfying (A.2) is given by ε := 1−(
Q4
i=1(1−ε(i))).
To derive the above-mentioned numbers, we introduce the following notation. Deﬁne
sτ+1(x): =s(sτ(x)), recursively, for any τ ≥ 0, and set s0(x): =x, where s(x)r e p r e s e n t s
the direct successor to x under the overall process governed by the environmental process
on Θ and the adjustment rules (O) and (I). Similarly, let sτ+1(qO),s τ+1(qI)a n dsτ+1(θ)
represent the analogous operators with respect to the optimizers’ quantity, the imitator’s
quantity and the environmental state, respectively. The operator sτ+1(·)g i v e st h e( τ +
1):th successor to its argument.
Case k =1 : Let x =( qO,qI,θ) ∈ X1 be arbitrary. Because of s(qO)=BR(qI;s(θ)) ≤
θH/π11, we have s(x) ∈∪ 5
i=2Xi.S i n c e ∪5
i=2Xi is absorbing, setting m(1) := 2 and
ε(1) := 0 implies Px(τX1 (m(1)) < ∞) ≤ ε(1) < 1f o ra l lx ∈ X1.
Case k =2 : Let x =( qO,q I,θ) ∈ X2 be arbitrary, i.e. 0 ≤ qO ≤ θH/π11 <q I.
Since the environmental process (θt)t≥0 is irreducible and recurrent, there exists a ﬁnite
sequence (s0(θ),s 1(θ),...,s T(θ)), having positive probability under the environmental
process, such that sT(θ)=θ1 for some 0 ≤ T<H .
If there exists τ ∈ {0,...,T− 1} such that uO(sτ(x)) ≥ uI(sτ(x)), then sτ+1(qI)=
sτ(qO). Since ∪5
i=2Xi is absorbing, it follows that sτ(qO) ≤ θH/π11 for all τ > 0. In
particular, we have sτ+1(qI)=sτ(qO) ≤ θH/π11 and sτ+1(qO) ≤ θH/π11 and hence
sτ+1(x) ∈∪ 5
i=3Xi.
If, to the contrary, uO(sτ(x)) <u I(sτ(x)) for all τ =0 ,...,T−1, then sτ(qI)=qI >
θH/π11 for all τ =1 ,...,T.In particular, this implies
s
T(q
O) ≤ θH/π11 <s
T(q
I). (A.3)




























24where the last inequality follows from Assumption (E) because of
θ1 < (1 − 2ρ(H − 1))θH < (1 − ρ)θH
which, in turn, holds true because adding up the inequalities in Assumption (E) yields
θH − θ1 > 2(H − 1)ρθH. (A.5)
By Lemma 1, inequalities (A.3) and (A.4) imply uO(sT(x)) >u I(sT(x)) so that sT+1(x) ∈
∪5
i=3Xi.
Thus, in both cases we have sT+1(x) ∈∪ 5
i=3Xi for some T<H .
We can now derive the values for ε(2) and m(2). To deﬁne ε(2), let rh1 be the joint
probability of all environmental paths from θh to θ1 (h>1) that involve strictly less
than H transitions. Similarly, let r1 be the minimum of all joint probabilities rh1, i.e.
r1 := minh>1 rh1. Since the environmental process is irreducible it must be that rh1 > 0,
for all h>1, and hence r1 > 0. Thus, setting m(2) := H +1a n dε(2) := 1 − r1 implies
Px(τX2 (m(2)) < ∞) ≤ ε(2) < 1f o ra l lx ∈ X2.
Case k =3 : Let x =( qO,qI,θ) ∈ X3 be arbitrary so that 0 ≤ qO,qI ≤ θH/π11. It
follows that s(qO)=BR(qI,s(θ)) ∈ [q
h,qh]f o rs o m eh =1 ,...,H such that s(θ)=θh.
Thus, s(x) ∈∪ 5
i=4Xi so that m(3) := 2 and ε(1) := 0 imply Px(τX1 (m(3)) < ∞) ≤
ε(3) < 1f o ra l lx ∈ X3.
Case k =4 : Let x =( qO,qI,θ) ∈ X4 be arbitrary, i.e. 0 ≤ qO,qI ≤ θH/π11 and
qO ∈ [q
h,qh]s u c ht h a tθh = θ. Deﬁne e q implicitly by




We distinguish two cases depending on whether qI > e q or not. Notice that (A.6) is
equivalent to




Consider qI > e q ﬁrst. Similar to case k =2a b o v e ,t h e r ee x i s t saﬁnite sequence
of environmental states, (s0(θ),s 1(θ),...,s T(θ)), having positive probability under the
environmental process, such that sT(θ)=θ1 for some T<H . On the one hand, if
uO(sτ(x)) ≥ uI(sτ(x)) for some τ =0 ,...,T − 1, then sτ+1(qI)=sτ(qO) ∈ [q
i,qi],
where i satisﬁes θi = sτ(θ). Similarly, sτ+1(qO)=BR(sτ(qI);θj) ∈ [q
j,qj], such that
sτ+1(θ)=θj. It follows that sτ+1(x) ∈ b Xij, which implies sτ+1(x) ∈ X5 because of
b Xij ⊂ b X = X5. On the other hand, if uO(sτ(x)) <u I(sτ(x)) for all τ =0 ,...,T − 1,








































By Lemma 1, we thus have uO(sT(x)) >u I(sT(x)). An argument similar to the one
above (now applied w.r.t. T rather than τ)s h o w ssT+1(x) ∈ b Xij ⊂ X5, where θi = sT(θ)
and θj = sT+1(θ).
Second, consider qI ≤ e q. Again, since the environmental process is irreducible, there
exists a ﬁnite sequence (s0(θ),s 1(θ),...,s T(θ)), having positive probability, such that
sT(θ)=θH for some T<H .I fuO(sτ(x)) ≥ uI(sτ(x)) for some τ =0 ,...,T− 1, then,
b yt h es a m ea r g u m e n tu s e da b o v e ,w eh a v esτ+1(x) ∈ b Xij ⊂ X5, where θi = sτ(θ)a n d
θj = sτ+1(θ). On the other hand, if uO(sτ(x)) <u I(sτ(x)) for all τ =0 ,...,T−1, then




































Second, notice that sT(qO) >s T(qI)i se q u i v a l e n tt oθH/π11 > (1+ρ)qI. Therefore, it is
suﬃcient to show that
(1 + ρ)θ1 < (1 − ρ)θH, (A.10)
since (A.10) and (A.7) imply
(1 + ρ)q







To see (A.10), notice that (A.5) is equivalent to
θH(1 − ρ(H − 1)) > θ1 + ρ(H − 1)θH,
26and hence implies
θH(1 − ρ) > θH(1 − ρ(H − 1)) > θ1 + ρ(H − 1)θH > θ1(1 + ρ),
which yields sT(qO) >s T(qI). Combined with (A.9), it thus follows from Lemma 1 that
uO(sT(x)) >u I(sT(x)). The same argument as the one applied for the case qI > e q then
shows sT+1(x) ∈ b Xij ⊂ X5, where θi = sT(θ)a n dθj = sT+1(θ).
We can now derive the values for ε(4) and m(4), respectively. To deﬁne ε(4), recall
(i) that rh1 denotes the joint probability of all environmental paths from θh to θ1 (h>1)
involving strictly less than H transitions, (ii) that r1 represents the minimum of all these
joint probabilities rh1, i.e. r1 := minh>1 rh1, and (iii) that r1 > 0. Similarly, (i) let rhH
be the joint probability of all environmental paths from θh to θH (h<H )i n v o l v i n g
strictly less than H transitions; (ii) let rH be the minimum of all joint probabilities rhH,
i.e. rH := minh>1 rhH and notice (iii) that it must be rhH > 0, for all h<H ,and hence
rH > 0, since the environmental process is irreducible. Fix r := min{r1,r H} > 0.
Then, setting m(4) := H+1andε(4) := 1−r implies Px(τX2 (m(4)) < ∞) ≤ ε(4) < 1
for all x ∈ X4, which completes the proof of Lemma 3. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose the environment is irreducible and deterministic.
The proof is divided into two parts. We ﬁrst establish that b X is reached within 2H +6
periods. Subsequently, we show that, having entered b X, the process converges to a
unique limit cycle.
Part i): To show that b X is reached within 2H + 6 periods, recall the numbers
m(k),k=1 ,...,4, provided in the proof of Lemma 3 iii). Notice that, for deterministic
environments, these numbers translate into lower boundaries after which the respective
level set Xk has been left with certainty. Correspondingly, we can set ε(k): =0 , for all
k =1 ,...,4. It follows that m =
P4




Px(τ b XC (2H +6 )< ∞)=0 , for all x ∈ b X
C.
Thus, b X is reached within 2H +6pe r i od s .
Part ii): Fix T<∞ such that xT ∈ b X. By Lemma 2, it follows that uO(xt) >
uI(xt) and hence qI
t+1 = qO







t ;θt+2)f o r a l l t ≥ T. (A.11)




































27for any K ∈ N. For some arbitrary θt ∈ Θ, let K := min{k ∈ N : θt+2k = θt} denote
the minimum number of double periods such that the environmental process returns to
θt.N o t i c e ﬁrst that K does not depend on θt, since the environment is deterministic.
Second, we have K = H if H is odd, whereas K = H/2 holds true for H being even.
Next, we make use of the cycling environment, which implies that θt = θt+2lK for all













































































kθT+2K−2k.( A . 1 4 )

























The claim then holds true, since we can choose T ≥ min{t : xt ∈ b X} and hence θT = e θh
and h ∈ H arbitrarily (where h ∈ H denotes the position of θT in the environmental
cycle (e θ1,...,e θH)). ¥
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 . 1 . The proof is divided into the following parts.
i) P b X is well-deﬁned, i.e., P b X (x,A): =P
³
x,A ∩ b X
´
deﬁnes a transition probability
kernel;
28ii) P b X is a (weak) Feller chain;
iii) P b X is a T-chain;
iv) P b X is Harris recurrent;
v) P b X is aperiodic;
vi) P b X is ϕ−irreducible;
vii) P b X is positive.
Part i): We will show that P b X (x,A): =P(x,A ∩ b X)d e ﬁnes a transition prob-
ability kernel (for a deﬁnition, see Meyn and Tweedie, 1996, p. 65). First, for all
A ∈ B( b X),Pb X (·,A) is a non-negative measurable function on b X, because P(·,A∩ b X)i s
a non-negative measurable function on X, for all A ∈ B( b X), which follows from Propo-












= P b X (·,A),
for all x ∈ b X, which completes the proof of Part i).
Part ii): By deﬁnition, a transition probability kernel is a (weak) Feller chain if and
only if P(·,O) is lower semicontinuous for any open set O ∈ B(X)( c f . M e y na n d
Tweedie, 1996, Sec. 6, p. 127). Therefore, it is suﬃcient to show that the level sets
{x ∈ b X : P b X (x,O) ≤ c} are topologically closed, for any c ∈ R and any open set
O ∈ B( b X) (cf. Meyn and Tweedie, 1996, Appendix D.4, p. 520).
Let O ∈ B( b X)b es u c ha no p e ns e ta n dﬁx c ∈ R. Observe
n






x ∈ b Xh : P (x,O) ≤ c
o
,
where b Xk := ∪g∈H\{k} b Xgk, for k ∈ H, and
n














x ∈ b Xk :
X
(i,j)∈J





where Oij := O ∩ b Xij. Consequently, it is suﬃc i e n tt os h o wt h a tt h el a s ts e ti n( A . 1 5 )
is closed, for any k ∈ H. Moreover, since the sum of lower semicontinuous functions
constitutes a lower semicontinuous function itself (cf. Berge, 1963, p. 77, Theorem 5),
we are done if we can show that the sets {x ∈ b Xk : P (x,Oij) ≤ c} are closed for any set
29Oij ∈ B( b Xij)t h a ti so p e nr e l a t i v et o b Xij. Notice that, since the sets b Xij, (i,j) ∈ J, are
disconnected, O is open relative to b X if and only if each Oij is open relative to b Xij (i.e.
for all (i,j) ∈ J).
Let (i,j) ∈ J be arbitrary and let Oij ∈ B( b Xij)b eo p e nr e l a t i v et o b Xij. Observe ﬁrst
that P (x,Oij) ∈ {0,r ij} for all x ∈ b X and all (i,j) ∈ J and that, second, P (x,Oij) > 0
only if x ∈ b Xi.
If c<0t h e n{x ∈ b Xk : P (x,Oij) ≤ c} = ∅, which is closed. If c ∈ [0,r ij)t h e n
n













x ∈ b Xk : P (x,Oij) > 0
o
is open. To this end, deﬁne fij : b Xi |Q2→ b Xj |Q2
















The fij’s represent the deterministic transitions on the action space Q2 given the envi-
ronment makes a transition from θi to θj and taking into account that uO >u I on b X.
Observe that each fij is continuous. Furthermore, for any k = L,H,
n
















On the one hand, if k 6= i then this set is empty and hence open. On the other hand, if
k = i then this set is open because it represents the inverse image of the open set Oij
under the continuous function fij. Thus, {x ∈ b Xk : P (x,Oij) ≤ c} is closed, for any
c ∈ [0,r ij).
Finally, if c ≥ rij then {x ∈ b Xk : P (x,Oij) ≤ c} = b Xk, which is closed.
Part iii): P b X is a T−chain.
We have to establish that there is a distribution a = {a(t)}
∞
t=0 on N and a sub-
stochastic transition kernel T such that




t (x,A)a(t) ≥ T (x,A) ∀x ∈ b X,∀A ∈ B( b X),
b) T (·,A) is a lower semicontinuous function ∀A ∈ B( b X),
c) T(x, b X) > 0 ∀x ∈ b X.
We ﬁrst deﬁne T and show that T satisﬁes c). Set T (x,A): =P l (x,Ao), for all
x ∈ b X and all A ∈ B( b X), where l is chosen such that Pl(x, b Xo) > 0 for all x ∈ X (Ao
denotes the interior of the set A). Such l<∞ exists because for some ﬁnite sequence of
environmental cycles the process comes arbitrarily close to the H-period cycle described
in Proposition 2, and because this cycle is contained in the interior of b X. It follows that
T(x, b X)=Pl(x, b Xo) > 0, for all x ∈ b X, which shows c).
Second, we establish that T deﬁnes a sub-stochastic transition kernel, that is,
30• T (·,A) is a non-negative measurable function on b X, for all A ∈ B( b X), and
• T (x,·) is a probability measure on B( b X), with the exception that T(x, b X) ≤ 1, for
every x.
The ﬁrst property holds true, because A ∈ B( b X) implies Ao ∈ B( b X)a n ds i n c e
Pl (·,A o) is a non-negative measurable function on b X.As to the second property, T (x,A)=
Pl (x,Ao) ≥ 0, for all A ∈ B( b X), and T(x, b X)=P l(x, b Xo) ≤ 1 follows from Pl (x,·)











T (x,Ai)( A . 1 6 )
for all pairwisely disjoint sets {Ai}i∈N (Aj 6= Ak , for all j,k ∈ N such that j 6= k). To







































i. This shows that T (x,·) constitutes a (sub)probability
m e a s u r e ,w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tT deﬁnes a substochastic transition kernel.
Third, T (·,A)i sal o w e rs e m i c o n t i n u o u sf u n c t i o n ,b e c a u s ePl (·,A o)i sal o w e rs e m i -
continuous function. The latter holds true, since Ao is open and Pl (·,A o)i sa( w e a k )
feller chain on b X. This completes b). Finally, setting a := fl (where fl : N0 → {0,1}
such that fl(t)=1i ft = l and fl(t) = 0 otherwise), we obtain Pl (x,A)=Ka (x,A) ≥
T (x,A)=Pl (x,Ao) because of Ao ⊆ A,w h i c hc o m p l e t e sa ) .
Part iv): P b X is Harris recurrent.
According to Tuominen and Tweedie (1979, Theorem 4.2.), P b X is Harris recurrent if
a)t h e r ee x i s t sx0 ∈ b X such that infx∈ b X Px {τN < ∞} > 0 for every neighborhood N of
x0, and b) P b X is a T−chain. Since a) follows from Proposition 2, the claim holds true.
Part v): P b X is aperiodic, ﬁrst, because ∪(i,j)∈J b Xij forms a partition of b X, second,
because of Lemma 2 and, third, because the environmental chain is aperiodic.
Part vi): P b X is ϕ−irreducible.
By Proposition 2, we have
P
t∈N0 Pt (x,O) > 0, for any x ∈ b X and any neighborhood
O of the H-period limit cycle induced by some arbitrary environmental H-period cycle
(i.e., in terminology of Meyn and Tweedie, 1996, all states corresponding to any such
limit cycle are reachable). Because of Pt
b X (x,O)=P t (x,O) for all x ∈ b X and all
O ∈ B( b X), the claim follows from Proposition 6.2.1 in Meyn and Tweedie (1996, p.133).
Part vii): P b X is positive (i.e., it admits an invariant probability measure).
Since b X is bounded and topologically closed, b X is compact. The claim thus follows
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